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ABSTRACT 
BASEL CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS AND BANK BEHAVIOR: 
EVIDENCE FROM TURKISH BANKING SYSTEM 
  
Deryol, Ahmet 
M.S. Department of Management 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Zeynep Önder 
September 2014 
 
In this study I examine the effects of Basel capital requirements on the 
behavior of Turkish banks for the period between December 2002 and 
December 2013. Turkish banks are found to increase their lending rates by 
17.33 basis points in case of a one-percent rise in equity to asset ratio. When 
the same analysis is applied to state, private and foreign banks, it is found 
that state banks behave differently and decrease their lending rates when 
they increase their equity to asset ratio. As a second analysis, I examine how 
banks react when they are exposed to regulatory pressure to increase their 
equity to asset ratio. I use simultaneous equations methodology to measure 
the effects of regulatory pressure. The findings indicate that private banks do 
not change their behavior, state banks increase their equity to asset ratio and 
foreign banks decrease their risk level when they are exposed to regulatory 
pressure. 
Keywords: Basel capital requirements, Turkish banks 
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ÖZET 
BASEL SERMAYE DÜZENLEMELERİ VE BANKA 
DAVRANIŞLARI: TÜRK BANKACILIK SİSTEMİ ÖRNEĞİ 
 
Deryol, Ahmet 
Yüksek Lisans, İşletme Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Zeynep Önder 
Eylül 2014 
 
Bu çalışmada Basel sermaye düzenlemelerinin Türkiye’de faaliyet 
gösteren bankaların davranışı üzerinde yarattığı etkiler analiz edilmektedir. 
Aralık 2002-Aralık 2013 döneminde aylık veriler kullanılarak Türkiye’de 
faaliyet gösteren bankalar, özkaynak/toplam varlık oranının yüzde bir arttığı 
durumlarda kredi faizlerini 17.33 baz puan artırmaktadır. Aynı analizler 
kamu bankaları, özel bankalar ve yabancı bankalar olarak ayrı ayrı 
uygulandığında, kamu bankalarının farklı davranarak özkaynak/toplam 
varlık oranını artırdığında kredi faizlerinde düşüş yaptığı gözlemlenmiştir. 
İkinci bir analiz olarak bankaların özkaynak/toplam varlık oranını artırması 
yönünde baskıya maruz kalması durumunda davranış biçimleri 
incelenmektedir. Bu amaçla analizde eşanlı denklem çözümleme yöntemi 
kullanılmıştır. Bulgularımıza göre böyle bir durumda özel bankalar 
davranışlarını değiştirmemekte, kamu bankaları sermaye/toplam aktif 
oranlarını artırmakta, yabancı bankalar ise risk seviyesini azaltmaktadır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Basel sermaye düzenlemeleri, Türk bankaları 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Banks are the most dominant players in the financial sector. Their main 
function in the economy is financial intermediation and they use external 
sources while doing their business. They have a tendency to take risks due to 
their nature of business model. However, any problem in the banking sector 
creates contagion effect, is transmitted to the rest of the financial system and 
affects negatively the whole economy. All of these factors make the resiliency 
of banks very important. Several regulations have been issued to promote a 
more resilient banking sector, to reduce riskiness of banks and to improve 
banks’ ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress. 
Basel Capital Accord was created in 1988 in order to strengthen the stability of 
banking system. 
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Basel capital requirements have been introduced to cover banks from 
unexpected stress conditions and minimize their default risk. As for all 
regulations, besides the contribution the resiliency, capital regulations were 
criticized that they prevent banks from performing their financial 
intermediation function. It is argued that heightening capital requirements 
increases the cost of funding for banks and bank reacts by increasing their 
lending rates under the assumption that marginal cost of equity is higher than 
marginal cost of deposits. How banks change their behavior after capital 
requirements is an empirical question.  
 
The relationship between capital requirements and lending rates has 
been estimated for several economies. For example, Cosimano and Hakura 
(2011) predict the impact of one percent increase in equity to asset ratio on 
lending rate by using the bank data from advanced economies and observe 
that banks increase their lending rates but the size of the increase changes by 
country. Although BRSA (2012) estimates that a one percent increase in equity 
to asset ratio causes 19 basis points increase in lending rates of Turkish banks, 
their analysis is based on six Turkish banks and considered only current 
levels of variables.  
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The Basel capital requirements have two components: risk and capital. 
Capital adequacy is defined with total regulatory capital and risk adjusted 
assets. A bank can change its capital adequacy ratio by either increasing its 
capital level or decreasing its risk level or both. Any regulatory pressure for 
the banks to increase their capital level due to capital requirements may result 
in either raising capital or decreasing risk.  
 
In this thesis, first, the effect of increase in equity to asset ratio on 
lending rates is estimated for Turkish banks using monthly data for the 
period between December 2002 and December 2013. My hypothesis is that 
higher equity to asset ratios is associated with higher lending rates because 
equity financing is considered to be more costly than debt financing to some 
extent due to tax benefits. I expect that heightened equity to asset ratios will 
result in higher lending rates. In order to test this hypothesis, I used a two 
stage model. In the first stage equity to asset ratio (E/A) is predicted. In the 
second stage, lending rates are estimated using predicted E/A ratio and 
controlling for deposit interest rates, non-interest expenses, non-performing 
loans and size. It is estimated that Turkish banks increase their lending rates 
by 17.33 basis points when equity to asset ratio increases by one percent. 
When the same model is applied to state, private and foreign banks 
separately, private and foreign banks are found to increase their lending rates 
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by 8.43 and 43.85 basis points respectively whereas state banks are found to 
decrease their lending rates by 125.41 basis points because of 1% increase in 
equity to asset ratio. 
 
 In the second part, I examine how Turkish banks react to regulatory 
pressure of  increasing capital adequacy ratios. My hypothesis is that Turkish 
banks react regulatory pressures either increasing their capital or decreasing 
their risk level. Academic literature suggests that banks determine their 
capital and risk level simultaneously. In this regard, I estimate change in risk 
and change in capital simultaneously. My findings indicate that state banks 
increase their capital level and foreign banks decrease their risk level; whereas 
private banks neither increase their capital nor decrease their riskiness. 
  
The remaining of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents 
the historical progress of Basel capital requirements both globally and in 
Turkish legislation. Chapter 3 focuses on the outlook for Turkish banking 
sector. Chapter 4 provides information about the previous discussion in 
literature on the effects of capital requirements on bank behavior. In this 
section I concentrated on empirical and theoretical studies on this issue. 
Chapter 5 introduces the data and elaborates the methodology used in the 
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analysis. Chapter 6 discusses the descriptive statistics and the results of the 
analysis. Chapter 7 presents conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BASEL CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
AND TURKISH LEGISLATION 
  
 
Banking crises beginning in 1970s created a necessity to efficient 
regulation of the banking sector and international convergence of capital 
regulations. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was established 
in 1974 which operates under Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to 
prepare international regulations for the banks. The studies of BCBS are 
evaluated under the heading of “Building Resilient Financial Institutions”. 
 
Capital requirements regulations are the main tool of the BCBS to 
create resilient financial institutions. The first capital requirements (Basel I) 
was provisioned in 1988. BCBS revised their requirements several times. It has 
made the last radical change in 2011 (Basel III) with the aim of increasing the 
quantity and quality of bank capital. 
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Basel I defines capital adequacy ratio for banks to make them have 
sufficient capital so that the stability of international banking system is 
strengthened. They created Basel II norms in 2004 in order to create 
international standards that regulators can use to ensure that banks have 
sufficient capital appropriate to hold the risk that they are exposed to.  
 
The first standard Basel I on capital requirements was mainly 
concentrated on the definition of capital adequacy ratio which takes into 
account the riskiness of assets. According to this standard, banks are obliged 
to maintain at least minimum 8% capital adequacy ratio (BCBS, 1988). 
 
Regulatory capital has two components: Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 
capital. Tier 1 capital is core capital, mainly consists of equity (paid in capital 
and reserves). In addition to this, there are some components of the balance 
sheet of the banks which have similar behavior with the equity. Tier 2 capital 
is considered as supplementary capital, mainly composed of general 
provisions, subordinated debt and revaluation reserves. Tier 2 capital is 
limited up to 100% of the Tier 1 capital. Risk weighted assets are calculated by 
multiplying bank assets by corresponding risk weights. The assets are 
multiplied by four different risk weights, i.e. 0,20,50 and 100%, depending on 
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the default risk of assets. Off balance sheet exposures are evaluated by using 
conversion factors before they are multiplied with risk weights. In addition to 
credit risk, in 1996 market risk was also incorporated to the Basel capital 
requirements in order to cover risks arising from movements in market prices. 
Basel Committee allowed  banks to use their internal models to calculate 
capital adequacy ratios but these internal models have to be approved by the 
regulatory authorities.  
  
Although simplicity of the requirements leaded to increase the easiness 
of understanding the requirements, standards were criticized since risk 
sensitivity of requirements was considerably low and standards did not cover 
risks arising from counterparties. BCBS introduced new standards which 
increased the risk sensitivity of the model to cover weaknesses of Basel I and 
set the regulatory infrastructure on three pillars: Minimum capital standards, 
supervisory review process and market discipline. The new standards were  
introduced in 2004 and revised in 2006. By the introduction of Basel II, the 
definition of capital has changed and operational risk is considered in risk 
weighted assets calculation in addition to credit risk and market risk. 
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Basel capital framework was revised in 2009 and BCBS published a 
new document called ‘Enhancements to the Basel II framework’. In addition 
to this, the regulations for market risk and trading book have developed after 
the global financial crisis. BCBS aimed to capitalize better the risks arising 
from the risky investments of banks. By the introduction of requirements 
securitization activities have been better capitalized and off balance sheet 
exposures are better addressed. 
 
‘Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and 
banking systems’ was published in 2011. It introduces leverage and liquidity 
standards for banks in addition to capital requirements. In this framework, 
capital is defined in three ways: Common Equity Tier 1 capital (CET1), Tier 1 
Capital and Total Capital. CET1 consists of mainly common shares, retained 
earnings and reserves, total Tier 1 capital is sum of CET1 and mainly 
preferred stocks,  total capital is the sum of T1 Capital and T2 Capital which 
include mainly general provisions, subordinated debt and revaluation 
reserves addition to T1. Banks are obliged to maintain at least 4.5%, 6% and 
8% capital levels of risk weighted assets as CET1, T1 capital and total capital 
respectively.  
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Table 1. Basel III Capital Adequacy Framework 
%2 Tier 2 Ratio 
%1.5 Additional Tier 1 
%4.5 Core Tier 1 Ratio 
In Turkey, the first capital requirements for banks was introduced in 
October 1989 following the publication of Basel I capital requirements. 
Additional legislations were introduced in 1995, 1998, 2001, 2002 and 2006, 
consistent with the revisions of the BCBS on capital requirements. The 2006 
capital requirement legislation was modified in 2007 and 2008. The current 
legislation has been published in 2012 which follows Basel II capital 
requirements and modified in 2013 and 2014 as to involve most of the 
regulations of Basel III. According to the progress report on implementation 
of Basel regulatory framework, Turkey is one of the countries which fully 
implements Basel III capital requirements (BCBS, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
T
o
ta
l 
T
ie
r 
1 
R
at
io
 %
6 
T
o
ta
l 
C
ap
it
al
 R
at
io
 %
8
 
11 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3  
 
 
TURKISH BANKING SECTOR1 
 
 
There are 49 banks currently operating in Turkey as of April 2014 with 
total assets of 1.8 trillion Turkish lira (approximately 860 billion USD). The 
ratio of total assets to GDP is 111% as of April 2014. This ratio is low 
compared to developed economies and indicates that there is the potential for 
growth. Global crisis was a kind of stress test for Turkish banks which shows 
robust structure against crisis. Turkish banking sector also sustained its 
positive outlook in the global crisis period and none of the banks liquidated in 
this period. High loan and asset growth rates have potential to erode capital 
ratios. Therefore, the supervision of capital adequacy in the high growth 
period has key role in order to reach sustainable growth. 
                                                          
1 All data in this section is gathered from BRSA and CBRT databases. 
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3.1. Growth and Market Share 
 
Turkish banking sector is dominated by deposit banks. As of April 
2014, 90.5% of Turkish banking sector assets is held by deposit banks (Figure 
1). On the other hand, the asset growth rates of participation and 
development and investment banks are higher than deposit banks. On April 
2014 the annual growth rates of assets and loans are 24.5% and 27.8% (Figure 
2). Turkish banking sector has experienced growth even in the crisis period. In 
addition to this, growth rates have cyclical behavior as expected. 
 
3.2. Asset Quality and Source of Financing 
 
Turkish banks perform traditional banking activities considering high 
share of loan and deposit stocks in the balance sheet. The share of deposit and 
loans in the total liabilities and the total assets are 54.6 and 62.2 % respectively 
as of April 2014 (Figure 3,4).  Financing of assets is heavily dependent on core 
funding sources since deposit and equity are the main funding sources. 
Figure 1.  The Market Share Distribution of Turkish 
Banks (%) 
Figure 2. The Asset and Loan Growth (yoy %) 
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As of 2014, 2.75 % of total loans are non-performing loans. During the 
global crisis period, NPL ratio increased and reached its peak level on 
September 2009 since then, Turkish banks has been able to decrease it to 
better levels. 
Figure 5. The Evaluation of Non-Performing Loans of Turkish Banks (%) 
 
3.3. Profitability 
 
The profitability ratios of Turkish banks have been decreasing 
gradually since the global crisis period (Table 2). The return on equity ratio 
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(%), April 2014 
Figure 4. The Liability Distribution of Turkish Banks 
(%), April 2014 
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(ROE) of Turkish banks declined to 13% in 2013 from 22% in 2007. ROE is 
decomposed as the multiplication of return on assets (ROA) and equity 
multiplier (EM). Equity multiplier is the ratio of average assets to average 
equity. The decrease in ROE can be explained by the shrinkage of ROA by 
1.15%. Although banks increased their leverage in some years, they are 
unable to sustain their past profitability performance.  
 
ROA consists of two components: profit margin (PM) and asset 
utilization (AU). The diminishing trend of the either ratios causes ROA ratios 
of the banks to decrease. From this point of view, I may assert that Turkish 
banks experienced both cost control and revenue generation problems. In 
terms of cost control, the ratio of non-interest expense to total income ratio 
increases. The loan loss provisions to total income ratio has maintained its 
heavy increase trend. The decreasing tendency of interest income and non-
interest income ratios of Turkish banks signs the deterioration of revenue 
generation performance. The main reason of the decrease in asset utilization 
ratio is the deteriorating performance of banks on both net interest income 
generation and non-interest income generation. The loan and deposit interest 
rate spreads have been diminished in recent years so it is reflected in net 
interest income. The figures for the non-interest income ratios, suggest that 
15 
 
Turkish banks have also experienced problems in generating non-interest 
income. 
Table 2. The Profitability Analysis for Turkish Banks 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
ROE= ROA*EM                 
Net Income/ Average Equity 
(ROE)% 19.90% 21.95% 16.54% 20.46% 18.02% 14.22% 14.41% 13.13% 
Net Income/ Average Assets 
(ROA)% 2.51% 2.75% 2.04% 2.58% 2.40% 1.78% 1.82% 1.59% 
Average Assets/ Average Equity 
(EM) 7.9 8.0 8.1 7.9 7.5 8.0 7.9 8.3 
ROA=PM*AU                 
Net Income/Total Income 
(PM)% 32.16% 34.25% 27.57% 32.07% 35.18% 30.25% 29.10% 26.91% 
Total Income/Average Assets 
(AU)% 7.79% 8.02% 7.41% 8.03% 6.83% 5.90% 6.24% 5.91% 
PM=1-((NIE+LLP+Tax)/TI)                 
Non-Interest Expense/Total 
Income (NIE/TI)% 53.06% 51.21% 54.63% 44.32% 48.04% 55.23% 53.00% 54.53% 
Loan Loss Provisions/Total 
Income (LLP/TI)% 5.95% 6.82% 11.19% 15.71% 8.60% 6.29% 9.75% 11.49% 
Tax/Net Interest Income % 8.84% 7.72% 6.61% 7.90% 8.18% 8.23% 8.15% 7.07% 
AU= (Net Interest Income+Non 
Interest Income)/Average 
Assets (AA)                 
Net Interest Income/Average 
Assets% 4.68% 4.82% 4.72% 5.34% 4.20% 3.54% 4.04% 3.70% 
Non-Interest Income/Average 
Assets% 3.11% 3.21% 2.69% 2.70% 2.63% 2.36% 2.21% 2.21% 
Source: Calculations         
3.4. Capital Adequacy 
 
Capital adequacy ratios of Turkish banks are in a downward trend 
since 2003. The main reason for this downward trend is rapid loan growth. 
There is inverse relationship between high loan growth and capital adequacy 
ratio in Turkish banking system. The average annual year on year growth of 
total loans is 25% for the period between 2007 and 2013. In this period, 
16 
 
profitability of Turkish banks which is one of the main sources of capital, did 
not increase enough to sustain loan growth.  
  
On April 2014, the capital adequacy ratio of all Turkish banks was 
16.07%. Figure 6 presents how capital adequacy ratio of all Turkish banks has 
changed from December 2002 to April 2014. It was more than 30% after the 
banking crisis in Turkey and it declined gradually. This ratio was stable 
around 18% after the global crisis. It reached its minimum level at the end of 
January 2014 (15.02%). The loan growth of sector was controlled by the 
beginning of 2014 and this was reflected as increase in capital adequacy ratios. 
Figure 6.  Capital Adequacy Ratios of all Turkish Banks , Dec. 2002-April 2014 (%).  
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the target capital ratio (12%), set by the Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Authority (BRSA). On the other hand, capital buffers have great importance 
for banks to sustain their growth performance. However, in the future, low 
and downward trended capital adequacy ratios might distort the growth 
potential of Turkish banks. 
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CHAPTER 4  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 The optimal capital structure for corporations has been discussed since 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) and debt financing has generally accepted as less 
costly than equity financing considering tax benefit of debt. Additionally, 
being shareholder of a company is riskier than being lender so shareholders 
require more return than lenders. Borrowing for a bank is easier than raising 
equity since the procedures of increasing capital are more compelling than 
borrowing. Furthermore, financial institutions generally operate with high 
leverage due to their nature and business model. Nevertheless, capital 
requirements for the banks limit in choice of capital and debt financing 
choices of them. 
 
19 
 
 In the literature, several studies examine how capital requirements 
affect banks’ financing and risk taking decisions from theoretical point of 
view. There are also several empirical studies examining increasing capital 
requirements on lending rates and how regulatory pressure affect bank 
behavior in different countries. Bank behavior is measured in two ways: 
changing its equity to asset ratio or/and changing risk levels. 
 
 Chami and Cosimano (2010) analyze optimal bank capital by defining 
capital as a call option where the strike price is the difference between optimal 
loan level for the bank in the next period and the amount of loans funded by 
capital. If in the next period loan level exceeds the capital level then 
theoretical call option becomes exercisable. Increasing the capital level 
decreases the strike price so banks gain flexibility. Therefore, they conclude 
that banks hold more capital than required in order to better response loan 
demands in future. On the other hand, they assert that heightening capital 
requirements of banks has unclear effect on banks’ optimal capital decision 
level. First, higher capital requirements lead the strike price to decline so the 
value of call option increases. However, the raise in regulatory capital also 
causes marginal payoff of the option decrease. Therefore, they conclude that 
heightening capital requirements has ambiguous impact on the capital level. 
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 Thakor (1996) analyzes the effects of increasing risk weights of the 
loans of banks. He develops a theoretical approach to analyze the impact. In 
his model there are two instruments which banks allocate their money: 
government securities and lending. Also, there are several banks in the model 
and when a borrower needs lending, it is assumed that borrower applies for 
the loan to all banks in the model. Another assumption in the model is that 
government security investing does not need capital financing since risk 
weight applied to them is 0%. The loan applicants are classified as “good” or 
“lemons” based on their creditworthiness. If the credibility of applicant is 
“lemon” level, no banks provide lending to this customer. If the credibility is 
“good” then banks consider their cost of funding. If the lending rates are 
higher than their cost of funding then they provide lending. The preliminary 
assumption in this model is that equity financing is more costly than debt 
financing. In the model, he considers a scenario where risk weights for the 
loans increased. In such a condition, he concludes that the amount of lending 
decreases and cost of lending increases since the cost of loan funding 
increases for all banks in the model. 
 
 Ediz, Michael and Perraudin (1998) try to find whether regulatory 
pressure has an effect on UK bank behavior or not controlling for bank 
profitability and riskiness related variables and regulatory pressure. They 
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measure regulatory pressure in two ways. They first add a dummy which 
equals 1 when bank increases capital requirement ratio in three consecutive 
periods. As a second methodology, they define another dummy variable 
which equals unity when the bank specific capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is 
lower than the minimum legal CAR plus bank specific standard deviation of 
CAR. Considering the significance and positive signs of two dummies, they 
conclude that regulatory pressure has an effect on bank behavior which 
causes banks to increase their capital adequacy ratios. They also check 
whether banks increase their ratios by raising capital or replacing higher risky 
assets with lower risky assets. They run the same regression by changing 
dependent variable as 100 percent weighted assets (risky portion of total risk 
weighted assets) divided by total risk weighted assets. In the model 
regulatory pressure measure variables are not significant so it is concluded 
that regulatory pressure does not lead banks to replace risky assets with 
lower risky assets. 
 
 Rime (2001) tries to identify whether regulatory pressure on Swiss 
banks’ capital has effect on their capital and riskiness level. In order to 
determine the effects of regulatory capital, he applies a simultaneous 
equations model using change in capital level and risk level as dependent 
variables. He defines regulatory pressure by using two different 
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methodologies. First, he uses probabilistic measure to measure regulatory 
pressure as it is used Ediz et al. (1998) which reflects the impact of capital 
ratio’s volatility on the probability of a bank not having adequate capital. 
Then, he uses three stage least squares methodology to estimate the 
simultaneous equations model. Based on the significance levels of regulatory 
pressure measure on both equations, he concludes that while regulatory 
pressure has significant and positive effect on bank capital, it has no 
significant effect on the level of risk. 
 
Heid, Porath and Stolz (2004) focus on capital buffer theory which 
predicts that under capital requirements, banks’ behavior depend on the size 
of their capital buffer. Capital buffer is defined as the excessive portion of 
bank specific CAR above regulatory minimum. According to capital buffer 
theory banks with high CAR try to maintain their capital buffer and banks 
with low capital buffer try to rebuild their capital level. They provide 
empirical evidence for 570 German savings banks over the 1993-2000 period. 
In the model, they use simultaneous equations model considering the 
rigidities and adjustment cost that prevent banks from making discretionary 
adjustments as assumed in capital buffer theory. To analyze the variables 
affecting the levels of capital and risk, they use size, bank’s return on assets, 
current loan assets, a merger dummy variable and local insolvencies as 
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explanatory variables. Moreover, in order to distinguish banks according to 
their size of capital buffer, they define a regulatory dummy. Then, they test 
the effects of size of capital buffer in terms of three different specifications 
which are the magnitude of capital and risk adjustment, speeds of the 
adjustment and the relationship between the adjustment in capital and risk. 
The results suggest that capital and risk adjustments depend on the level of 
current capital level for banks. Banks with low capital buffers try to rebuild an 
appropriate capital buffer by increasing capital while decreasing risk. In 
contrast, banks with high capital buffers increase risk when capital increases 
by maintaining their capital buffer. Moreover, banks do not adjust capital 
when risk changes. In addition, there is no evidence that banks with low 
capital buffers adjust capital and risk faster than banks with high capital 
buffers. Ultimately, all these findings are consistent with the results of the 
capital buffer theory.   
 
Abdel-Baki (2012) analyzes the effects of Basel III regulations about 
capital adequacy, leverage and liquidity standards on the loan growth, 
recapitalization and liquidity enhancement. Data is gathered from Bankscope 
database.  1546 banks from 47 emerging economies in 2001-2006 period are 
used in the analysis in order to both avoid external shocks arising from global 
crisis. She defines a z-score for individual banks indicating that the needed 
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number of loan growth standard deviations under mean loan growth to 
comply with Basel III requirements for banks by summing average loan 
growth/GDP, recapitalization/GDP and liquidity enhancement/GDP and 
dividing the sum by standard deviation of loan growth/GDP. In the analysis, 
z-scores of individual banks are used as dependent variable in an ordinary 
OLS estimation. The controls for country and bank characteristics are divided 
into three categories which include compliance of Basel III requirements, 
country characteristics like inflation, GDP growth etc. and bank characteristics 
such as size, loan loss provision, ROE etc.  They determine the compliance 
with Basel III requirements by defining an index which gets 4 when banks 
perfectly compliant and 0 when banks non- compliant. It is realized that 
capital adequacy compliance has negatively and statistically significant effect 
on z- scores of banks. Abdel-Baki concludes that compliance with the Basel III 
capital requirements has negative effect on average loan growth, 
recapitalization and liquidity enhancements of emerging economies’ banks. 
 
 Kashyap, Stein and Hanson (2010) analyze the effects of increasing 
capital requirements on lending rate of US banks. They estimate that US 
banks increase lending rates by 2.5-4.5 basis points with respect to 1 percent 
increase in equity to total assets ratio. They base the analysis on tax benefit of 
debt financing and they assume the banks’ cost of capital increase directly 
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reflected in lending rates.  In the first scenario, they assume that instead of 
raising equity, banks decrease their long term debt level. Assuming that the 
cost of long term debt is 7 percent and corporate tax rate 35 percent in US, 
they assert that 1 percent increase in equity to assets ratio reflects in lending 
rates 0.07*0.35 = 2.45 basis points. In the second scenario, they assume that 
equity crowds out short term debt which has 1 percent money premium in 
addition to tax benefit. Therefore, in the second scenario the total effect of 
heightening equity to assets ratio is 3.5 basis points. In the last scenario they 
assume the money premium increases to 2 percent so the net effect is 4.5 basis 
points. In conclusion, basing the analysis on tax benefit, Kashyap, Stein and 
Hanson find the effect of increasing capital requirements on lending rate 
between 2.5 and 4.5 basis points. 
 
 Elliott (2009) analyzes the outcomes of heightening capital 
requirements of banks by identifying lending rates of banks as the function of 
funding side components of bank balance sheet. He assumes lending rate of 
banks is affected only by the share of equity funding, cost of equity, cost of 
debt, the credit spread, administrative expenses and other benefits to the bank 
arising from loan. As the base scenario he assumes banks operate minimum 
capital requirements which is 6% for Tier 1 and determines cost of equity, cost 
of debt, credit spread, administrative costs and other benefits of loans as 15, 2, 
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1, 1.5, and 0.5 percent respectively based on past experiences in the US 
banking system (tax rate 30%). He calculates lending rate for a bank as 5.17 
percent using the above assumptions for the variables are valid. He widens 
the analysis by increasing the share of capital funding to 8% and 10% holding 
other variables constant. Then he assumes variables other than equity funding 
changed in alternative scenarios. For the scenarios he considered and 
assumptions of 8 percent capital funding and 10 percent capital funding, he 
calculates the lending rates increase up to 5.94 percent. 
 
 Macroeconomic Assessment Group (MAG, 2010 a and b) of the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) examine impacts of increased capital requirements on lending spreads 
of banks. They apply the analysis on 17 developed and emerging countries 
and Euro area. They use change in the deposit-lending spreads as dependent 
variable and selected macroeconomic variables including aggregated capital 
ratios as independent variables. However, although dependent variable is the 
same for all countries, independent variables change considering the 
characteristics of individual countries. For example, they use capital adequacy 
ratios of banks, previous period lending spreads, mortgage lending and net 
personal wealth to personal income as explanatory variables for United 
Kingdom’s analysis. In their first report (2010a), they analyze the effects of 
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capital ratios on the next 32 quarter deposit-lending spreads. They conclude 
that one percent increase in capital requirements causes lending spreads to 
increase 17.3 basis points as median value of countries at the next 18th quarter 
(highest effect) and 15.3 basis points at the next 32nd quarter as median 
compared to base period. In their second report (2010 b) they expand their 
analysis to 48 quarter. Based on the unweighted median results of countries, 
they find that one percentage increase in capital requirements results banks to 
increase their lending spreads 15.5 basis points at the 35th quarter (highest 
effect) and 12.2 basis points at 48th quarter. 
 
 Sutorova and Teply (2013) also focus on the impacts of Basel III capital 
requirements on lending rates. They focus on 594 EU banks during the period 
between 2006 and 2011. They use Chami and Cosimano’s (2001, 2010) model 
to analyze the effect of the capital requirements on the loan volumes and loan 
interest rates of EU banks. In the model they refer the capital as a call option. 
They examine the impacts of Basel III on the capital choice, loan rate and 
loans level. In order to estimate the choice of capital and loan rate, they use 2-
stage least square methodology and to describe the amount of loans provided, 
they employ heteroskedasticity – adjusted OLS model. According to results of 
the model, there is a positive and significant relationship between common 
equity ratio and the loan rate, i.e., a one percentage point increase in the 
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common equity ratio leads to 18.8 basis points increase in the loan rate. 
Moreover, there is a negative relationship between the interest rate of loans 
and loans provided as expected, i.e., a 1% increase in interest rate of loans 
leads to 0,156% decrease in loans provided which shows the negative 
elasticity of demand for loans. As a result, with the capital requirement, there 
is a modest drop in loans provided due to low elasticity of demand for loans 
in Europe. Therefore, critics about the negative effects of capital requirements 
on economic output through the increased interest rates and a reduced 
volume of loans provided are not justified by the econometric model 
developed by Sutorova and Teply. 
 
 Cosimano and Hakura (2011) examine how heightening capital 
requirements affect lending rates in twelve developed countries using data 
from 100 largest banks worldwide. They gather data from Bankscope for the 
banks operating in 12 different countries for the period of 2001-2009. In their 
analysis they first estimate the equity to asset ratio using the banks’ initial 
level of equity to asset, interest expense ratio, non-interest expense ratio, non-
performing loan (NPL) ratio and total assets. Using the estimated capital 
adequacy ratio, in the second stage, besides interest expense ratio, non-
interest expense ratio, NPL ratios, total assets and year dummies, they 
estimate the effect on the lending rates. They conclude that one percent 
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increase in equity to asset ratio leads 12.2 basis points increase in lending 
rates. In addition to this, they analyze the capital needs of 100 largest banks to 
comply with capital requirements and they conclude that banks need to 
heighten their capital by 1.3 percent. Combining the findings of two analyses, 
they conclude that Basel capital requirements would lead 100 largest banks 
worldwide to increase their lending rates by 16 basis points (1.3*12.2=16). 
They also run the same analysis for 12 individual countries. They find 
significant results except for Canada and Korea. The effects of increasing 
equity to asset ratio by one percent on lending rates are represented table 
below. 
 
Table 3. The Effect of Increasing Capital Requirements on 
Lending Rates in Selected Countries 
Countries Lending Rates (basis points) 
Canada 0.3 
Czech Republic 10.5 
Denmark 19.1 
Germany 11.6 
Greece 8 
Ireland 21.6 
Japan 26.1 
Korea 5.5 
Sweden 2 
Switzerland 0.9 
UK 6.4 
US 13.1 
 
 The effects of heightening capital requirements in Turkey is estimated 
in BRSA (2012) using the methodology by Elliot (2009). According to their 
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model, the interest rate on loans should cover the sum of all the cost of 
providing credit, including cost of capital and other funding sources, any 
expected credit loans and administrative expenses. Based on their analysis 
with Basel III of only commercial banks, they conclude that the marginal 
effect of increasing capital requirements on lending rates is 19 basis points at 
the aggregate level. 
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CHAPTER 5  
 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 In this thesis, I have two main hypotheses. I examine how increase in 
capital requirements affect banks’ behavior in terms of their lending rate, 
capital and risk. The first hypothesis is that an increase in equity to asset ratio 
increases lending rates for Turkish banks. The second hypothesis is related 
with the reaction of Turkish banks to regulatory pressures increasing their 
capital or decreasing risk level or both. I expect that Turkish banks increase 
their capital or reduce risk level or both when they face with regulatory 
pressures to increase their capital adequacy ratio. 
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5.1. Data 
 
The data used in the analysis obtained from the database of The 
Central Bank of Turkey (CBRT). Banks operating in Turkey report to BRSA 
and CBRT simultaneously their balance sheets, income statements, lending 
and deposit rates on a regular basis. The dataset is in the panel data format 
and consists of the monthly data of 29 commercial banks beginning from 
December 2002  ending in December 2013. I have an unbalanced panel. Only 
23 banks have data in the full period of December 2002-2013. During the 
sample period, the dataset covers both viable and non-viable banks and some 
new banks started to operate, some merged with others or acquired by other 
banks. 
 
Only commercial banks are analyzed in the study since main function 
of them is to collect deposit and supply loans. I do not include the 
participation banks because their  deposit rates are determined based on the 
performance of their asset pool and they are not pre-determined. I exclude 
foreign banks operating in Turkey through their branches from my sample.  
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The commercial banks used in the analysis are divided into three as 
state banks, private banks and foreign banks based on their ownership 
structure. The categorization of the Banks Association of Turkey is used in 
this classification. During the sample period, some banks changed their 
ownership type. For example, some private banks were acquired by foreign 
banks. 
 
5.2. Methodology 
 
My first research question examines the relationship between equity to 
asset ratio and lending rate. The second question analyzes how banks 
respond to regulatory pressures. 
 
5.2.1. Relationship between Equity to Asset Ratio and Lending Rate Model 
 
A model developed by Casimano and Hakura (2011) is used in order to 
capture the effects of heightening capital adequacy ratio on lending rate. It is a 
two stage model. In the first stage, the equity to asset ratio for each bank is 
estimated. In the second stage, the effect of equity to asset ratio on lending 
rate is estimated. 
        (1) 
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                                                                                         (2) 
 
CAPj,t is the equity to assets ratio of bank j in month, 
LOANRj,t is the weighted average lending rates of individual banks, 
DEPj,t is the weighted average deposit rates, 
NIEj,t is the non-interest expense to total assets ratio, 
NPLj,t is the non-performing loan to total assets ratio, 
LN (SIZEj,t) is the  natural logarithm of total assets of bank j in month t. 
RGL2007 and RGL2012 are two dummy variables indicating the regulatory changes regarding   
to capital adequacy ratio in Turkey, 
d2004, d2005,…, d2013 are  year dummy variables, 
εj,t and γj,t are error terms. 
  
A two stage model is employed in order to eliminate the endogeneity 
problem. I realized the existence of endogeneity due to the high causality 
relationship between equity to asset ratio and lending rate (Appendix B). At 
the first stage, I run a model which uses equity to asset ratio as dependent 
variable and the fitted values are used as input in the second stage model to 
estimate lending rate. In this regard, I eliminated the endogeneity problem 
arising from equity to asset ratio. 
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Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation were the other econometrical 
problems (Appendix A). To get heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
adjusted estimates (HAC)2 with fixed effects, I use Driscoll-Kraay (2000) 
adjustment. 
 
5.2.1.1. Variables 
 
5.2.1.1.1. Lending Rate 
 
LOANR is the weighted average lending rates by maturity for Turkish 
lira denominated loans. It does not cover the interest rates of foreign exchange 
denominated loans.  
 
5.2.1.1.2. Capital 
 
Capital (CAP) is measured by the ratio of total equity to total assets. It 
is one of the main determinants of cost of funding for banks. Therefore, it is 
expected that capital has positive effect on lending rates. Similarly, capital in 
the previous period and any change in capital are expected to increase capital 
ratios. 
 
                                                          
2
 Stata code, xtscc 
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5.2.1.1.3. Deposit Interest Rate 
 
Deposit interest rate (DEP) is measured as the weighted average 
deposit interest rates by currency and maturity. The weights are determined 
by the share of deposits in different maturities. Deposit rates have also direct 
effect on the cost of funding. Therefore, my preliminary expectation for 
deposit rate is that it should have positive effect on lending rates. Deposit rate 
may have twofold effect on equity to asset ratio. Since increases in deposit 
rate is reflected in income statement, the increase in deposit rates may cause 
the equity to asset ratio to decrease. On the other hand, deposit funding and 
equity funding are substitute of each other. Therefore, if the interest rate of 
deposits increases, banks may change their behavior and increase the share of 
capital in their balance sheet. 
 
5.2.1.1.4. Non-Interest Expense 
 
Non-interest expense (NIE) is the ratio of non-interest expense to total 
assets. Since it is hard to calculate non-interest expenses for collecting deposit, 
I approximated it by dividing total non-interest expenses to total assets. Since 
non-interest expense is directly reflected in cost of funding, my expectation is 
that it should have positive effect of lending rates. My expectation for the 
coefficient of non-interest expense on the equity to asset is the same as deposit 
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rates. I expect that non-interest expense may affect the equity to asset ratio in 
either way regarding the twofold effect on it. 
 
5.2.1.1.5. Non-Performing Loans 
 
Non-performing loan (NPL) is measured as the ratio of non-
performing loan to total assets. Since non-performing loans are additional cost 
item for new lending, I expect that increase in NPL is also reflected in lending 
rates. Since it has direct effect on profitability, my expectation is that its 
coefficient in the model for equity to asset ratio is negative. 
 
5.2.1.1.6. Size 
 
Size is measured with the total assets of the banks. I took the logarithm 
of total assets. Also, in the real value analysis, all the total asset data is 
expressed as of January 2003 CPI.  
 
I expect that size has positive effect on lending rates since big banks 
may have better power to control lending and deposit interest rates. In 
addition to this, it is hard to determine the direction of the effect of the size on 
equity to asset ratio.  
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The model to analyze the relationship between equity to asset ratio and 
lending rate is estimated for nominal and real interest rates. In the estimation 
of real lending rate, all monetary values, i.e., size is expressed in terms of 
January 2003 values, calculated using CPI. 
 
5.2.1.1.7. Regulation and Year Dummies 
 
Turkish legislation on the capital adequacy ratios is modified several 
times between 2002 and 2013. Among those changes November 2006 (put into 
force in June 2007) legislation and June 2012 legislation which is still in force 
have significantly affected capital adequacy ratios of banks.  Therefore, I 
added regulation dummies (RGL) to control its effects. In addition to this year 
dummy variables for year effects are added in the model, taking 2003 as a 
base year. 
  
Lending rates have decreased gradually in Turkey since 2003 because 
of decline in inflation rate. Therefore, I expect that the coefficients of year 
dummies to have negative signs in lending rate model. Additionally, 
regulations have tightened the capital adequacy obligations of Turkish banks. 
RGL variables are expected to have positive effect  on lending rates and 
equity to asset ratio.  
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5.2.2. Bank Response to Regulatory Pressure Model 
 
Capital adequacy ratio which is defined by the Basel Committee has 
two main components: capital and risk. Banks can change their capital 
adequacy ratio both by increasing their capital level or decreasing the share of 
risky assets.  Hence, the regulatory pressure on capital adequacy ratio will 
simultaneously affect both capital and risk levels of banks.  
 
In analyzing the bank’s response to regulatory pressure, a 
simultaneous equations model developed by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and 
Rime (2001) is employed. Their model recognizes that change in both capital 
and risk has exogenous and endogenous components and focuses on the 
determination of endogenous changes in capital (risk) that are induced by 
both exogenous and endogenous change in risk (capital). 
 
The following simultaneous equations model is estimated: 
 
                   (3) 
 
                (4) 
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∆CAPj,t and ∆RISKj,t  are the change in equity to assets ratio and  
change in risk weighted assets to total assets ratio of bank j from month t-1 to t, 
respectively. 
REGj,t is the dummy variable for regulatory pressure, 
ROAj,t is the ratio of net income to total assets, 
SIZEj,tis measured within the natural logarithm of total assets, 
LLOSSj,t represents the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets, 
RGL2007: is dummy variable for the 2007 capital adequacy ratio regulatory change, 
RGL2012 is  dummy variable for the 2012 capital adequacy ratio regulatory change, 
d2004, d2005,…, d2013 are year dummies, 
εj,t and γj,t are error terms. 
 
5.2.2.1. Variables 
 
5.2.2.1.1. Risk 
 
Risk is measured with the ratio of risk weighted assets (RWA) to total 
assets. If the bank holds less risky assets, the ratio will approach to 0, in other 
words risky banks have higher RISK coefficient. An increase in RWA to total 
assets ratio indicates an increase in the riskiness of a bank. ΔRISK is the 
change in the RWA to total assets ratio from month t-1 to t. 
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5.2.2.1.2. Regulatory Pressure 
 
In the literature regulatory pressure is defined in several ways as 
explained in the literature review chapter. For example, Ediz et al. (1998) 
defines a dummy which takes 1, if capital level decreases for three 
consecutive periods. As an alternative measure, they define a target capital as 
a summation of the regulatory minimum capital and one standard deviation 
of actual capital hold by an individual bank. If the actual capital level is below 
this target capital, bank will face a regulatory pressure. 
 
In the analysis, the second approach is followed to define regulatory 
pressure in Turkish banking system. During the sample period December 
2002-2013, banks in Turkey mostly satisfied the minimum capital 
requirements both at the aggregate level and individually. Therefore, I 
evaluated that banks are exposed to regulatory pressure if they have lower 
capital than the regulatory minimum plus bank specific standard deviation of 
capital ratio. A dummy variable is created that takes a value of 1 if the capital 
ratio is less than target ratio and 0 if it is higher than the target. Based on this 
definition, Turkish banks are exposed to regulatory pressure 1151 times 
during the period December 2002-2013. Total observation is 2966.  
 
42 
 
I expect that regulatory pressure has positive effect on change in capital 
and negative effect on change in risk. In the model, profitability, size, loan 
loss provisions, regulatory changes and year effects are controlled. 
 
5.2.2.1.3. Return on Asset 
 
Profitability is measured with return on asset which is one of 
determinants of change in capital since shifts in profitability are reflected 
directly in capital. Based on this assertion, ROA is expected to have positive 
effect on the change in capital. 
 
5.2.2.1.4. Size 
 
Size is specified as the natural logarithm of total assets. Although the 
coefficient of size in the capital model is ambiguous since big banks may have 
potential to better manage their risks, it is expected to be negative in the 
change in risk model. 
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5.2.2.1.5. Loan Loss Provisions 
 
Loan loss provision (LLOSS) is calculated by dividing loan loss 
provision by the total assets. If bank holds more risky assets in their portfolio, 
their risk is higher. So, the coefficient of LLOSS is expected to be positive in 
the risk model.  
 
5.2.2.1.6. Regulation and Year Dummies 
 
Regulation dummy variables that are defined in part 5.2.1.1.7 are also 
used in this model. I also added year dummies in order to capture the year 
effects on change in capital and change in risk. 
 
The models are estimated for all banks as well as the three types of 
banks by ownership , i.e., state, private and foreign separately. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
6.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
6.1.1. Relationship between Equity to Asset Ratio and Lending Rate Model 
 
 
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis are 
represented in Table 4. There are 29 commercial banks operating in Turkey 
during the time period between December 2002 and December 2013. There 
are 3259 observations between 2002 and 2013. 
 
The mean value of the equity to asset ratio (CAP) is 0.1643. Although 
on average Turkish banks did not experience capital adequacy related 
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problems in the sample period, there are some banks that have lower equity 
to asset ratio than regulatory minimum. The minimum and maximum values 
for the equity to asset ratio are 0.033 and 0.916 respectively between 2002 and 
2013.  
 
The average value of the lending rate (LOANR) is 25.05%. The 
minimum rate for the lending is 6.11% whereas the maximum is 102.84%. At 
the beginning of the sample period, inflation and interest rates were high. The 
standard deviation, 14.33%, indicates big variation in lending rates over the 
sample period. 
 
The mean value for the deposit rate (DEP) is 14.25%. The minimum 
and maximum values for the deposit rates are 2.49 and 56.47% respectively. 
The standard deviation is also high for deposit rate which is 8.14%. 
  
The mean value for the non-interest expense (NIE) to total assets ratio 
is 0.466. The minimum value for non-interest expense to total asset ratio is -
3.75 whereas the maximum is 20.13. The non-interest expense is found by 
summing total non-interest expenses and total other non-interest expense 
(income) items in income statement. Since it is possible for total other non-
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interest expense (income) item to have negative balance, the non-interest 
expense to total assets ratio gets negative values for some observations. 
 
The average value of the non-performing loan (NPL) to total asset ratio 
is 3.58 during the sample period between 2002 and 2013. The minimum value 
for the NPL to total assets is 0 which means that there were some banks which 
experienced periods with no NPL. The maximum value, 78.33, is recorded by 
a bank that is in a liquidation process.  
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for the Variables Used in the Lending Rate Model 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max # of Obs. 
CAPj,t 0.16 0.15 0.03 0.92 3259 
LOANRj,t 25.05 14.33 6.11 102.84 3149 
∆CAPj,t-1 0.00 0.02 -0.40 0.45 3201 
DEPj,t 14.27 8.13 2.49 56.47 3254 
NIEj,t 0.47 0.66 -3.75 20.13 3230 
NPLj,t 3.58 8.78 0.00 78.33 3259 
LN (SIZEj,t) 15.73 2.02 10.11 19.15 3259 
SIZEnominal (000) 27,421,234 722,022 24,661 207,529,954 3259 
SIZEreal (000) 15,536,432 364,350 20,644 86,410,357 3231 
 
Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics for each year. Lending rates 
and deposit rates have decreased gradually, consistent with the decline in 
inflation rate. The equity to asset ratios is high in highly profitable years 
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which is parallel with my expectations (see Chapter 2). NPL to total asset ratio 
has experienced increase after 2003 and this increase lasts 2011 which can be 
evaluated as the end of global financial crisis period. There was no jump in 
2009 even if loan loss provisions increased during the global crisis years  (see 
Table 2). There might be two explanations. First, the total assets increased in 
the same period very rapidly and NPL increased slower proportionally and 
NPL to total assets ratio decreased. Second, non-performing loans may be 
excluded from the balance sheet by a loss in income statement. It is observed 
that the non-interest expenses have decreased over time. 
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for the Selected Variables in Lending Rate Model on a 
Yearly Basis 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
LOANRj,t 
(%)                         
Mean 57.74 52.35 36.03 28.24 23.92 24.29 23.38 21.30 15.00 13.77 15.21 12.38 
Std. Dev. 13.79 14.42 13.65 10.77 6.57 5.05 5.05 5.06 3.12 2.09 2.41 2.20 
Min 34.55 23.17 17.68 14.72 13.30 15.20 15.42 8.82 8.87 8.04 7.15 6.11 
Max 89.16 102.84 101.79 73.02 49.61 45.43 46.56 48.81 27.64 18.57 19.94 18.93 
# of Obs. 27 318 311 296 285 276 276 276 276 265 267 276 
CAPj,t                         
Mean 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.15 
Std. Dev. 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Min 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.04 
Max 0.85 0.92 0.73 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 
# of Obs. 28 318 312 308 297 288 288 288 288 277 279 288 
DEPj,t (%)                         
Mean 37.24 32.18 19.55 14.75 14.45 15.53 15.48 10.03 7.43 7.57 8.48 6.57 
Std. Dev. 7.27 7.72 2.42 1.87 2.37 1.92 2.46 2.46 1.05 1.59 1.95 1.54 
Min 25.12 9.42 9.78 9.62 6.58 9.74 7.85 4.37 4.06 3.03 3.04 2.49 
Max 52.88 56.47 26.19 21.00 19.47 19.63 21.41 17.25 9.54 11.52 12.26 9.65 
# of Obs. 27 317 312 306 297 288 288 288 287 277 279 288 
NIEj,t (%)                         
Mean - 0.57 0.66 0.60 0.50 0.44 0.46 0.40 0.41 0.36 0.36 0.34 
Std. Dev. - 0.96 0.74 1.40 0.70 0.36 0.46 0.21 0.22 0.17 0.22 0.20 
Min - -2.75 -3.19 -0.54 -3.75 -0.18 -1.09 -0.09 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 -0.05 
Max - 5.71 5.51 20.13 4.96 5.62 7.07 1.14 1.61 1.1 1.67 2.22 
# of Obs. - 318 312 308 297 288 288 288 288 277 278 288 
NPLj,t (%)                         
Mean 2.71 2.85 3.25 4.35 4.87 4.66 4.32 3.65 3.78 2.66 2.53 2.45 
Std. Dev. 2.39 2.55 6.72 12.16 15.04 14.65 12.92 3.38 3.02 2.43 2.45 2.40 
Min 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.61 0.52 0.20 0.00 0.00 
Max 7.32 20.05 51.06 78.30 78.33 76.14 75.86 18.19 18.44 12.82 12.97 12.91 
# of Obs. 28 318 312 308 297 288 288 288 288 277 279 288 
LN (SIZEj,t)                         
Mean 14.48 14.64 14.90 15.14 15.49 15.67 15.90 16.00 16.11 16.40 16.53 16.69 
Std. Dev. 1.91 1.80 1.81 1.87 1.87 1.91 1.90 1.93 1.98 2.01 2.00 1.99 
Min 10.11 10.64 11.14 10.72 10.72 10.75 10.75 10.82 10.82 10.84 10.82 10.82 
Max 17.44 17.66 17.86 17.99 18.14 18.21 18.46 18.64 18.83 18.95 18.99 19.15 
# of Obs. 28 318 312 308 297 288 288 288 288 277 279 288 
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Table 6 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
analysis based on the bank type. At first glance, I realized that state banks 
operate with lower capital adequacy ratios and higher leverage ratios than 
private and foreign banks. In addition, state banks have lower loan-deposit 
spreads compared to foreign and private peers. Private banks have highest 
non-performing loan ratio although their average lending rates are not the 
highest. Foreign banks have a good mixture of loans since they lend with the 
highest rate and they have lowest non-performing loans ratio. 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Lending Rate 
Model Based on Bank Type 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CAPj,t         
  State 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.10 
  Private 0.14 0.00 0.13 0.14 
  Foreign 0.16 0.00 0.15 0.16 
LOANRj,t 
      State 21.43 0.55 20.34 22.51 
  Private 24.34 0.33 23.70 24.98 
  Foreign 25.75 0.45 24.86 26.64 
DEPj,t 
      State 13.55 0.38 12.81 14.29 
  Private 14.79 0.20 14.40 15.18 
  Foreign 13.38 0.21 12.98 13.79 
NIEj,t 
      State 0.23 0.01 0.22 0.24 
  Private 0.45 0.02 0.42 0.48 
  Foreign 0.50 0.01 0.47 0.53 
NPLj,t 
      State 2.60 0.09 2.43 2.77 
  Private 2.35 0.08 2.19 2.50 
  Foreign 2.25 0.05 2.16 2.34 
LN (SIZEj,t) 
     State 17.88 0.03 17.82 17.95 
  Private 15.93 0.05 15.84 16.03 
  Foreign 15.27 0.05 15.18 15.36 
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Pairwise correlations of the variables are represented in Table 7. The 
correlations have high variability for the regression ranging between 0.4484 
(NPL and fitted E/A) and -0.9422 (logarithm of assets and fitted E/A). Since 
the correlation between logarithm of assets and fitted E/A are very high, I also 
conducted my analysis by excluding logarithm of assets from the model. 
However, the results did not change significantly. Logarithm of assets is 
negatively correlated with other independent variables. The correlation of all 
variables with each other is less than 0.5 and greater than -0.5 except for 
logarithm of assets and fitted E/A. 
Table 7. Pairwise Correlations of Variables Used in the Lending Rate Model 
  
Equity 
to 
asset 
ratio 
Fitted 
E/A 
Lending 
Rate 
Change 
in E/A 
ratio 
(lagged) 
Deposit 
Rate 
NIE 
to 
Asset 
NPL 
to 
Asset 
ratio 
Logarithm 
of Assets 
Equity to asset 
ratio 
1               
Fitted E/A 0.7269 1             
Lending Rate 0.2066 0.0114 1           
Change in 
equity to asset 
ratio (lagged) 
0.0553 0.0225 0.0389 1         
Deposit Rate -0.0593 -0.0249 0.7651 0.0481 1       
Non-Interest 
Expense to Asset 
0.2728 0.2458 0.1705 -0.0092 0.0782 1     
Non-Performing 
Loans to Asset 
0.6846 0.4484 0.1627 0.0259 -0.0717 0.2215 1   
Logarithm of 
assets 
-0.6176 -0.9422 -0.256 -0.0093 -0.2385 -0.2544 -0.3539 1 
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6.1.2. Bank Response to Regulatory Pressure Model 
 
The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the bank response to 
regulatory pressure model is represented in Table 8. The statistics are 
calculated by using monthly data of individual banks between December 2002 
and December 2013.  
 
The mean change in E/A ratio is -0.0001, almost zero. The risk weighted 
assets to total assets ratio (change in risk) increased 29.5% on average. Two 
different explanation can be derived for the positive value of change in risk 
variable. First, the banks operating in Turkey moved their investments to 
riskier projects. As a second explanation, the regulations enacted in Turkey 
increased the risk weights of the current composition of assets. From my point 
of view both of the explanations are valid for the Turkish banking system.  
 
The regulatory pressure dummy variable indicates that Turkish banks 
exposed to regulatory pressure in 38.81% of the bank-month combinations. 
Given the observation that Turkish banks hold higher capital than the 
regulatory minimum, the regulatory dummy variable seems to overestimate 
the pressure level. On the other hand, since the standard deviation of the bank 
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specific standard deviations for capital is so high, the number of pressure 
periods increased. 
 
The average monthly ROA and loan loss provisions to total asset are 
0.116% and 0.073% respectively. Turkish banks are profitable on average 
during the sample period between December 2002 and December 2013. 
Turkish banks allocate 0.073 percent of their assets as provision on a monthly 
basis on average. 
 
The mean of the risk weighted assets to total assets (risk level) is 71.08 
percent. Since the standard deviation of risk level is considerably high (22%), 
there is high variation in the riskiness behavior of Turkish banks. 
 
Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for Regulatory Pressure Model 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max # of Obs. 
Change in Equity to Asset Ratio 0.00 0.02 -0.12 0.17 2966 
Change in Risk 0.30 4.33 -35.15 23.61 2964 
Regulatory Pressure 0.39 0.49 0 1 2966 
Return on Asset 0.12 0.61 -19.10 5.46 2966 
Ln Size 15.94 1.97 11.00 19.00 2993 
Initial Equity to Asset 0.16 0.15 0.03 0.85 2965 
Loan Loss Provisions to Assets 0.07 0.26 -0.42 7.98 2966 
Initial Risk Level 71.09 21.93 9.13 124.45 2965 
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics for Regulatory Pressure Model on a Yearly Basis 
∆CAPj,t 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Mean 0.0035 0.0004 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0012 -0.0001 0.0014 -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0013 
Std. Dev. 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 
Min -0.05 -0.07 -0.12 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.07 -0.08 -0.05 -0.40 -0.04 
Max 0.17 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.04 
# of Obs. 294 288 284 273 264 264 264 264 253 254 264 
∆RISKj,t 
           Mean 0.38 0.59 0.08 0.26 1.09 -0.18 0.19 0.24 0.12 0.02 0.42 
Std. Dev. 4.46 4.17 4.08 4.26 4.50 5.23 4.66 4.15 3.49 4.13 4.27 
Min -35.15 -15.10 -15.59 -17.66 -20.33 -15.47 -27.64 -15.27 -12.63 -18.91 -19.81 
Max 19.18 20.18 21.16 20.05 17.91 23.22 21.99 18.95 14.49 23.61 16.59 
# of Obs. 293 288 284 273 264 264 264 264 253 254 263 
REGj,t 
           Mean 0.80 0.78 0.73 0.65 0.55 0.41 0.14 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Std. Dev. 0.40 0.41 0.45 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.35 0.21 0.11 0.00 0.11 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
# of Obs. 294 288 284 273 264 264 264 264 253 254 264 
ROAj,t (%) 
           Mean 0.15 0.02 0.05 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.07 
Std. Dev. 0.54 1.17 1.35 0.32 0.34 0.21 0.16 0.25 0.13 0.16 0.16 
Min -3.81 -11.28 -19.10 -1.09 -4.43 -0.58 -0.95 -0.42 -0.50 -1.09 -0.48 
Max 3.04 5.46 1.41 3.42 1.46 1.36 0.67 3.11 1.24 0.84 1.10 
# of Obs. 294 288 284 273 264 264 264 264 253 254 264 
SIZEj,t 
           Mean 14.92 15.12 15.36 15.68 15.83 16.11 16.17 16.30 16.58 16.75 16.91 
Std. Dev. 1.68 1.74 1.82 1.82 1.83 1.82 1.87 1.96 2.03 2.01 2.02 
Min 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 
Max 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 19.00 19.00 19.00 19.00 19.00 
# of Obs. 294 288 284 273 264 264 264 264 253 255 264 
CAPj,t-1 
           Mean 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15 
Std. Dev. 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 
Min 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.04 
Max 0.68 0.73 0.81 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 
# of Obs. 294 288 284 273 264 264 264 264 253 254 263 
LLOSSj,t 
           Mean 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.06 
Std. Dev. 0.30 0.73 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.06 
Min -0.42 -0.08 -0.13 -0.10 -0.35 -0.25 -0.17 -0.26 -0.10 -0.14 -0.14 
Max 3.38 7.98 0.83 0.54 0.90 0.75 0.64 0.55 0.26 0.46 0.39 
# of Obs. 294 288 284 273 264 264 264 264 253 254 264 
RISKj,t-1 
           Mean 51.48 57.43 60.42 63.06 70.61 82.04 77.39 80.63 79.76 82.24 82.29 
Std. Dev. 21.62 21.76 22.03 22.06 22.01 20.23 16.41 17.67 13.21 12.44 13.14 
Min 9.13 10.73 14.78 11.62 19.63 35.19 34.50 36.20 46.00 51.97 42.34 
Max 121.14 108.82 115.81 109.43 117.42 124.45 107.44 109.19 103.10 105.31 99.66 
# of Obs. 294 288 284 273 264 264 264 264 253 254 263 
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Pairwise correlations of the variables are represented in Table 10. The 
correlations of the independent variables vary between -0.61 and 0.187. Most 
of the independent variables have negative correlations meaning that they 
behave in opposite directions. In addition to this, the measure of the 
movements is not so high considering that most of the correlation values are 
close to 0. 
Table 10. Pairwise Correlations of Variables Used in the Regulatory Pressure Model 
  
Change 
in E/A 
Ratio 
Change 
in Risk 
Regulatory 
Pressure 
Return 
on Asset Size 
Initial 
Equity 
to Asset 
Loan Loss 
Provisions 
to Assets 
Initial 
Risk 
Level 
Change in 
E/A Ratio 
1               
Change in 
Risk 
0.4278 1             
Regulatory 
Pressure 
0.024 0.0362 1           
Return on 
Asset 
0.1073 0.0277 0.05 1         
Size -0.0524 -0.0173 -0.0918 0.1392 1       
Initial 
Equity to 
Asset 
-0.0268 -0.0374 -0.2281 -0.1807 -0.61 1     
Loan Loss 
Provisions 
to Assets 
0.0332 -0.0376 -0.043 -0.4768 -0.07 0.1169 1   
Initial Risk 
Level 
-0.0795 -0.1199 -0.2381 0.0726 0.187 -0.2458 -0.0337 1 
6.2. Result of the Regression Model 
 
6.2.1. Relationship between Equity to Asset Ratio and Lending Rate  
 
Two models are estimated to examine the relationship between equity 
to asset ratio and lending rate. Model I controls for equity to asset ratio, 
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deposit rate, non-interest expense, non-performing loans and total assets. 
Total assets are not controlled in Model II because of high correlation between 
predicted equity to asset ratio and total assets which is -0.942. It is found that, 
heightening equity to asset ratio by 1 percent increase lending rates by 17.33 
basis points (Table 11). When the size of the bank is controlled, a one percent 
increase in CAR is expected to 32.6 basis points increase in lending rates. The 
expected rate is similar to what was estimated using Elliot (2009) model. On 
overall, the sign of equity to asset coefficient is positive as expected. The effect 
increases to 18.68 basis points when I run analysis by using inflation adjusted 
real values. I reached interesting results when I run the same model to state 
banks, private banks and foreign banks individually. Increasing equity to 
assets ratio by 1 percent leads to -125.41, 8.43 and 43.85 basis points change on 
lending rates of state, private and foreign banks respectively. Subgroups 
respond to equity to asset changes differently. State banks decrease their 
lending rates when they increase their capital adequacy level.  
 
Deposit rates have significant and positive impact on lending rates. 
This statement is also valid for the subgroups.  
 
56 
 
The coefficients of non-interest expense to total assets variable get 
negative values in all analyses except for private banks. On the other hand, 
none of the coefficients are significant. This insignificant effect of non-interest 
expense can be explained with the proxy used, since it includes all expenses 
not specifically for collecting deposits. 
 
Non-performing loan to total asset variable has negative sign in 
estimating nominal, real lending rate and foreign bank lending rates. It is 
positive for state and private banks. The coefficients for state banks, private 
banks and foreign banks are found to be significant at 5, 10 and 1 percent 
level respectively. My preliminary expectation was NPL to asset ratio has 
significant and positive impact on lending rates. However, the reflection of 
higher NPL to asset ratio has no significant effect on overall analysis and 
negative impact on foreign bank lending rates. 
 
The regulation dummy variables  that are used to control the effects of 
regulatory changes are not found to have significant impact on lending rates 
except for RGL2012 variable in foreign bank analysis. The insignificant 
coefficients can be explained by the fact that Turkish banks are well 
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capitalized. Therefore, the changes in capital adequacy requirements have not 
reflected significantly on lending rate choices of banks. 
 
Both nominal and real lending rates in all years are significantly lower 
than those in 2003. The coefficient of year dummy variables are negative and 
significant impact on lending rates. In the analysis, I take 2003 as the base year 
and the coefficients compare the related year’s effect with 2003. The 
coefficients in nominal analysis decrease gradually almost all years. I deduce 
that lending rates decreased gradually almost all years after 2003 and this is 
parallel to my expectation. 
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Table 11. Second Stage Regression Results for the Lending Rate Model 
Dependent Variable: Lending Rate Nominal Rates Real Rates State Private Foreign 
 I II I II I II I II I II 
Constant -7.8478 32.4838*** -2.9101 28.5964*** 155.1783* 26.1995** 23.8572 28.4530*** -10.4784 40.6669*** 
  (19.8469) (2.7425) (8.6790) (2.3877) (37.1276) (4.0533) (19.2365) (2.3804) (28.2736) (4.3951) 
Equity to asset ratio 32.6048*** 17.3265*** 36.5839*** 18.6759*** -92.7566* -125.4085* 10.0125 8.4309** 64.2526*** 43.8515*** 
  (6.6405) (3.9859) (5.5243) (3.5800) (27.3423) (29.8807) (6.9753) (3.1114) (11.8349) (12.3361) 
Deposit Rate 0.5829*** 0.5450*** 0.6974*** 0.6394*** 0.6007* 0.6170* 0.6353*** 0.6302*** 0.3611** 0.3409** 
  (0.0745) (0.0702) (0.0722) (0.0672) (0.1716) (0.1786) (0.0520) (0.0557) (0.1344) (0.1337) 
Non-Interest Expense -0.0210 -0.0706 -0.0271 -0.0546 -0.4748 -0.9075 0.2303 0.2236 -0.5211 -0.5367 
  (0.2924) (0.2807) (0.2907) (0.2777) (1.7265) (1.7524) (0.1872) (0.1841) (0.5248) (0.5270) 
Non-Performing Loans to Asset -0.0683 -0.0952 -4.9506 -6.8385 1.9787* 2.7093** 0.2206* 0.2176* -1.4399*** -1.5683*** 
  (0.0809) (0.0789) (7.3368) (7.4658) (0.6414) (0.5171) (0.1179) (0.1184) (0.3414) (0.2950) 
Logarithm of assets 2.4752*   1.8122***   -7.5382*   0.2833   3.2894   
  (1.2269)   (0.4724)   (2.2059)   (1.2287)   (1.8107)   
Reg 2007 -0.3898 -0.0962 -0.1057 0.0808 0.0545 -0.3408 -0.2060 -0.1636 -0.1259 0.2267 
  (0.2501) (0.2022) (0.3791) (0.3712) (0.2417) (0.2130) (0.3116) (0.2356) (0.3602) (0.3143) 
Reg 2012 -0.7818** -0.3417 -0.3199 -0.1873 1.2618 0.7260 0.2165 0.2758 -1.9053*** -1.3724** 
  (0.3516) (0.2825) (0.4481) (0.4477) (0.6102) (0.5028) (0.4363) (0.3158) (0.5464) (0.4762) 
d2004 -9.4254*** -9.3219*** -7.6978*** -8.0839*** -7.1677* -7.2610* -7.7562*** -7.7503*** -12.2745*** -11.9259*** 
  (1.6852) (1.6342) (1.5040) (1.4641) (2.2838) (2.2078) (1.4259) (1.4112) (2.3321) (2.2786) 
d2005 -14.7489*** -14.3195*** -12.0429*** -12.5491*** -3.6235 -4.4166 -12.1930*** -12.1548*** -20.0888*** -19.1364*** 
  (2.0052) (1.9566) (1.9003) (1.8307) (2.7576) (2.5963) (1.7833) (1.7598) (2.6869) (2.6336) 
d2006 -19.4654*** -18.5699*** -16.3534*** -16.8149*** -3.5697 -5.3120 -16.3005*** -16.1954*** -25.3600*** -23.9918*** 
  (1.7946) (1.6386) (1.5519) (1.4687) (2.9486) (2.6356) (1.6816) (1.4751) (2.3836) (2.2683) 
d2007 -20.2738*** -18.9023*** -17.1396*** -17.3112*** -3.0677 -5.4479 -16.3630*** -16.1951*** -26.71844*** -24.7775*** 
  (1.8074) (1.5652) (1.4624) (1.392) (2.8619) (2.4820) (1.7703) (1.4233) (2.3156) (2.1430) 
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Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted standard errors are represented in parentheses. (***), (**) and  (*) indicate significance of 1, 5, and 10% levels separately. 
 
 
           
           
           
d2008 -21.7990*** -19.8405*** -18.4658*** -18.4009*** -4.9049 -8.7625* -17.5519*** -17.3285*** -28.2358*** -25.1736*** 
  (1.9520) (1.5807) (1.5260) (1.4694) (2.9881) (2.3750) (1.9189) (1.4213) (2.5552) (2.2270) 
d2009 -21.3321*** -19.0570*** -17.1666*** -17.0101*** -2.4118 -7.9708 -16.6975*** -16.4385*** -26.8621*** -23.1627*** 
  (2.4045) (2.0229) (1.9186) (1.8610) (4.0897) (2.9921) (2.2986) (1.7598) (3.3441) (2.7020) 
d2010 -26.4332*** -23.9383*** -21.7956*** -21.6390*** -2.9183 -9.5341 -21.5009*** -21.2180*** -32.1328*** -28.1485*** 
  (2.5704) (2.1241) (2.0159) (1.9520) (4.7801) (3.444) (2.4866) (1.8459) (3.6792) (2.9265) 
d2011 -27.9593*** -25.0241*** -23.1791*** -22.8273*** -2.4755 -10.4496* -22.1285*** -21.7788*** -34.6297*** -30.4182*** 
  (2.6616) (2.0846) (2.0088) (1.9225) (4.9858) (3.3691) (2.7128) (1.8693) (3.7694) (2.9234) 
d2012 -27.3398*** -24.0212*** -22.3167*** -21.7698*** -1.0272 -9.3506 -21.1013*** -20.7040*** -34.3064*** -29.6685*** 
  (2.6859) (1.9454) (1.8592) (1.7777) (4.9676) (3.2826) (2.7677) (1.7292) (3.7317) (2.7237) 
d2013 -28.9687*** -25.4467*** -23.4848*** -23.0318*** -1.6045 -11.3484* -22.7293*** -22.3123*** -36.0519*** -31.0983*** 
  (2.8703) (2.0460) (1.9568) (1.8619) (5.4152) (3.4025) (2.9324) (1.8243) (4.0642) (2.9077) 
within R-squared 0.7829 0.7824 0.7792 0.7783 0.9317 0.9281 0.8274 0.8274 0.7503 0.7489 
F Value 786.57 921.78 485.1 523.11 1350.24 1067.8 1018.93 1074.8 1283.72 805.9 
P Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 12 presents the estimated coefficients of the first stage model 
predicting equity to asset ratio. All of the variables in the model except for 
2004 and 2005 year dummy variables are found to be significant. The change 
in equity to asset ratio has positive and significant impact on equity to asset 
ratio. On the other hand, when I consider initial period equity to asset ratio, 
the impact of the previous period change in equity to asset ratio changes its 
sign but maintains its significance. In other words, higher equity to asset 
ratio in previous period decreases the impact of change in equity to asset 
ratio on current level equity to asset ratio. Deposit rate, non-interest expense 
to total asset and non-performing loan to total asset ratios have negative and 
significant impact on equity to asset ratio. The interaction effects of these 
variables with initial equity to asset ratio are found to be positive and 
significant. Size of banks is found to have negative impact on equity to asset 
ratio which is consistent with the preliminary expectations. Regulation 
changes in 2007 have significant effect only on private banks’ equity to asset 
choices. On the other hand, regulations in 2012 have significantly affected the 
capital choices of state, private and foreign banks. 
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Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted standard errors are represented in parentheses. (***), (**) and  (*) 
indicate significance of 1, 5, and 10% levels separately. 
 
Table 12. First Stage Regression Results of Equity to Asset Ratio 
Dependent Variable: Equity to Asset Nominal Real  State Private Foreign 
Constant 1.6363*** 1.0649*** 0.0825 1.7765*** 0.9735*** 
  (0.1112) (0.1076) (0.0970) (0.1321) (0.0673) 
Change in equity to asset ratio (lagged) 0.2117*** 0.1401** 0.5643 0.3099** -0.3520*** 
  (0.0595) (0.0661) (0.3202) (0.1329) (0.1046) 
Change in equity to asset ratio 
(lagged)*initial equity to asset ratio -0.4836*** -0.4613** -5.1332 -0.6350*** 1.6418*** 
  (0.1494) (0.1714) (3.4696) (0.1671) (0.3834) 
Deposit Rate -0.0045*** -0.0052*** -0.0020* -0.0051*** -0.0048*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0005) 
Deposit Rate*initial equity to asset ratio 0.0176*** 0.0180*** 0.0196* 0.0174*** 0.0272*** 
  (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0052) (0.0012) (0.0024) 
Non-Interest Expense to Asset -0.0110*** -0.0120*** -0.0359* -0.0136*** -0.0113** 
  (0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0085) (0.0029) (0.0043) 
Non-Interest Expense to Asset*initial 
equity to asset ratio 0.01560*** 0.0210** 0.2911* 0.0190*** 0.0424 
  (0.0046) (0.0080) (0.0794) (0.0055) (0.0249) 
NPL to Asset -0.0029** -0.2630** -0.0056 -0.0042** -0.0070** 
  (0.0011) (0.1086) (0.0024) (0.0017) (0.0027) 
NPL to Asset*initial equity to asset ratio 0.0042*** 0.3501*** 0.0887* 0.0057*** 0.0096 
  (0.0011) (0.1177) (0.0229) (0.0019) (0.0135) 
Logarithm of assets -0.0957*** -0.0557*** 0.0001 -0.1040*** -0.0554*** 
  (0.0070) (0.0066) (0.0055) (0.0078) (0.0045) 
Reg 2007 0.0109*** 0.0057*** 0.0013 0.0149*** 0.0043 
  (0.0029) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0036) (0.0034) 
Reg 2012 0.0165*** 0.0035 0.0069* 0.0203*** 0.0087** 
  (0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0020) (0.0044) (0.0036) 
d2004 0.0008 -0.0180 0.0026 -0.0044 0.0085** 
  (0.0080) (0.0113) (0.0019) (0.0154) (0.0033) 
d2005 0.0118 -0.0245* 0.0083* 0.0048 0.0193*** 
  (0.010) (0.0136) (0.0024) (0.0192) (0.0036) 
d2006 0.0264** -0.0275** 0.0104* 0.0250 0.0187*** 
  (0.0100) (0.0132) (0.0029) (0.0184) (0.0046) 
d2007 0.0460*** -0.0168 0.0114* 0.0479*** 0.0336*** 
  (0.0091) (0.0121) (0.0036) (0.0161) (0.0044) 
d2008 0.0704*** -0.0076 0.0060 0.0690*** 0.0585*** 
  (0.0108) (0.0125) (0.0045) (0.0165) (0.0080) 
d2009 0.0838*** -0.0042 0.0048 0.0839*** 0.0789*** 
  (0.0126) (0.0158) (0.0051) (0.0211) (0.0081) 
d2010 0.0918*** -0.0053 0.0090 0.0918*** 0.0845*** 
  (0.0138) (0.0175) (0.0059) (0.0234) (0.0082) 
d2011 0.1012*** -0.0085 0.0060 0.1098*** 0.0669*** 
  (0.0145) (0.0171) (0.0068) (0.0229) (0.0082) 
d2012 0.1171*** 0.0001 0.0104 0.1284*** 0.0750*** 
  (0.0142) (0.0156) (0.0071) (0.0213) (0.0082) 
d2013 0.1218*** -0.0064 0.0063 0.1328*** 0.0725*** 
  (0.0151) (0.0164) (0.0082) (0.0221) (0.0087) 
R-squared 0.6779 0.5243 0.8558 0.7487 0.7157 
F Value 167.56 88.68 144.34 181.84 182.88 
P Value 0.0000 0.000 0.0069 0.000 0.000 
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When I compared my study’s results with the Cosimano and Hakura 
(2011), I noticed that the findings almost overlap. In the first stage, the signs of 
all variables and significances in my study are parallel to the findings of them 
except for change in equity to asset (lagged) and change in equity to asset 
(lagged)*initial E/A. The sign of change in E/A is positive and the sign of 
change in E/A* initial E/A is negative and they are both significant at 1% level 
in my study. The signs of those variables are negative and they are not 
significant in Cosimano and Hakura (2011) study. For the second stage, the 
only difference arose from the significance of non-interest expense ratio. In 
my study I could not reach significant results for NIE to total assets. 
 
The R-squares of the first stage estimations vary between 52.43 and 
85.58%. In this regard, the independent variables that are used in the first 
stage have ability to explain most of the variability in the equity to asset ratio. 
The range of R-squares of the second stage estimation models is 0.7489-0.9317. 
The first and second stage R-squares are close to findings of Cosimano and 
Hakura (2011). 
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6.2.2. Bank Response to Regulatory Pressure Model 
 
The findings of the model examining the effect of regulatory pressure 
on banks behavior to change their capital and risk are represented in Table 13. 
For a sample of all types of banks, no significant effect of regulatory pressure 
on change in capital and change in risk is found. This result is somewhat 
surprising since banks that are exposed to regulatory pressure are expected to 
either increase their capital level or decrease their risk level or both. This 
insignificant effect might be explained by the E/A ratio of Turkish banks since 
they hold more than required minimum level of capital during sample period 
even though there is a downward trend. Hence, regulatory pressure measure 
based on as defined by Ediz et al. (1998) and Rime (2001) may not fit for the 
Turkish banks.  
 
The impact of regulatory pressure is different when the analysis is run 
for different types of banks. It is found that although private banks do not 
change their capital level or their riskiness with regulatory pressure, state 
banks significantly increase their capital level but do not change their 
riskiness whereas foreign banks significantly decrease their riskiness but do 
not change their capital when they are exposed to regulatory pressure.  
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The results indicate that return on asset (ROA), size, change in risk and 
initial E/A ratio have significant impact on the change in E/A ratio.  It is found 
that when profitability and riskiness of a bank increase, banks increase their 
capital ratio. However, if they have high E/A ratio at the beginning, they 
reduce their capital ratio. The bigger banks are found to reduce their equity to 
asset ratio.  The results are as expected similar to findings of Rime (2001). The 
way of the impacts of independent variables seems meaningful. Banks are 
found to increase their capital holdings protect themselves from the adverse 
effects of higher risks. Large banks and banks that have high capital at the 
initial level, are found to reduce their capital significantly in next period. 
 
The findings of second equation demonstrate that change in E/A ratio, 
initial period risk level and size have significant impact on the risks banks 
take but loan loss provision variable has not significant impact on change in 
risk. The signs of size and initial risk level variables are negative and the sign 
of change in E/A ratio is negative which is again consistent with the findings 
of Rime (2001). The negative sign of size variable in change in risk model 
contradicts that too big to fail theory since bigger banks in Turkey are more 
prone to taking lower risks.  
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The findings of the model for state, private and foreign banks are 
almost identical. They all increase their capital when their profitability 
increased. Initial level equity to asset ratio has negative impact on the changes 
in equity to asset ratio in the next period for all banks. Size has negative 
impact on their riskiness. 
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Table 13. Simultaneous Equations Results for Change in Capital and Change in Risk 
Dependent Aggregate State Private Foreign 
Variable ∆CAP ∆RISK ∆CAP ∆RISK ∆CAP ∆RISK ∆CAP ∆RISK 
Constant 0.1004*** 21.1072*** -0.0085 16.4074*** 0.0281* 9.9301*** 0.2512*** 55.5542*** 
  (0.0162) (3.2617) (0.0199) (6.1119) (0.0149) (3.5889) (0.0366) (6.9923) 
Regulatory 
Pressure -0.0006 -0.2127 0.0028*** -0.2320 -0.0014 0.3755 0.0007 -1.0291* 
  (0.0009) (0.2633) (0.0009) (0.4389) (0.0011) (0.3439) (0.0021) (0.5724) 
Return on Asset 0.0036***   0.0045**   0.0028***   0.0126***   
  (0.0004)   (0.0019)   (0.0004)   (0.0021)   
Change in Risk 0.0010***   0.0009   0.0008**   -0.0001   
  (0.0003)   (0.0006)   (0.0004)   (0.0004)   
Initial Equity to 
Asset -0.1392***   -0.0575***   -0.0684***   
-
0.3852***   
  (0.0078)   (0.0178)   (0.0079)   (0.0207)   
LLP to Assets   -0.3162   0.2544   -0.3348   -1.1161 
    (0.2796)   (0.7531)   (0.2642)   (1.7359) 
Size -0.0051*** -1.1055*** 0.0007 -0.8950*** -0.0013 -0.3796* -0.012*** -2.9062*** 
  (0.0009) (0.1829) (0.0012) (0.3475) (0.0009) (0.2220) (0.0023) (0.4587) 
Change in 
Equity to Asset 
Ratio   83.2305***   105.3756   72.3337***   54.8946*** 
    (11.4064)   (82.7297)   (22.4512)   (11.9725) 
Initial Risk 
Level   -0.0920***   -0.0706***   -0.0802***   -0.1577*** 
    (0.008)   (0.0162)   (0.0110)   (0.0165) 
Reg 2007 -0.0005 1.9101*** 0.0016 2.5798*** 0.0010 1.7315*** -0.0018 1.9570* 
  (0.0017) (0.479) (0.0022) (0.7219) (0.0020) (0.6066) (0.0037) (1.0090) 
Reg 2012 -0.0012 1.7621*** 0.0030 2.2424** 0.0025 1.6769** -0.0044 1.4132 
  (0.0024) (0.6785) (0.0026) (0.9608) (0.0027) (0.8498) (0.0053) (1.4635) 
d2004 0.0007 1.2589*** -0.0034*** 1.2332** 0.0006 1.1234*** -0.0045* 2.4356*** 
  (0.0011) (0.3217) (0.0013) (0.4973) (0.0013) (0.3955) (0.0027) (0.7275) 
d2005 0.0020* 1.2375*** -0.0008 0.8443*** 0.0005 0.3922 -0.0040 4.6770*** 
  (0.0012) (0.3327) (0.0013) (0.4606) (0.0013) (0.4037) (0.0031) (0.8160) 
d2006 -0.0003 1.9835*** -0.0026* 1.9605*** -0.0015 1.3101*** -0.013*** 4.9411*** 
  (0.0012) (0.356) (0.0014) (0.5019) (0.0014) (0.4319) (0.0031) (0.8555) 
d2007 0.0025 2.3440*** -0.0031* 1.7372*** -0.0009 1.5085*** -0.0044 5.9082*** 
  (0.0016) (0.4641) (0.0016) (0.6526) (0.0019) (0.5728) (0.0039) (1.0564) 
d2008 0.0049** 1.7231*** -0.0047* 1.1565 -0.0012 0.8282 0.0051 6.2123*** 
  (0.0021) (0.6291) (0.0024) (0.9667) (0.0024) (0.7763) (0.0051) (1.4291) 
d2009 0.0076*** 1.5629** -0.0020 0.6641 0.0011 0.8936 0.0089* 5.7775*** 
  (0.0022) (0.6329) (0.0025) (0.9189) (0.0025) (0.7834) (0.0052) (1.4302) 
d2010 0.0069*** 2.1885*** -0.0022 1.6167* -0.0006 1.5243* 0.0083 6.1643*** 
  (0.0022) (0.6501) (0.0025) (0.9496) (0.0026) (0.8071) (0.0053) (1.4540) 
d2011 0.0060*** 2.4050*** -0.0034 2.1817** -0.0018 1.5016* 0.0051 6.5970*** 
  (0.0023) (0.67) (0.0025) (1.0047) (0.0026) (0.8306) (0.0057) (1.5315) 
d2012 0.0078*** 2.8435*** -0.0011 2.1838** 0.0000 1.6989* 0.0072 7.7594*** 
  (0.0025) (0.7253) (0.0026) (1.0958) (0.0028) (0.8894) (0.0063) (1.6632) 
d2013 0.0098*** 3.4128*** -0.0052 3.9385*** -0.0030 2.2557** 0.0121* 8.2164*** 
  (0.0029) (0.8449) (0.0033) (1.3031) (0.0033) (1.0354) (0.0072) (1.9329) 
R-squared 0.3394 0.2343 0.1703 0.1665 0.2531 0.1581 0.3817 0.2796 
Chi-squared 966.17 336.57 65.97 61.49 352.55 128.8 689.2 210.81 
P value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted standard errors are represented in parentheses. (***), (**) and  (*) 
indicate significance of 1, 5, and 10% levels separately. 
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CHAPTER 7  
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
In this thesis, the effect of capital requirements on the behavior of 
Turkish banks is examined for the period between December 2002 and 
December 2013. First, it is found that Turkish banks are found to increase 
their lending rates when their capital ratio increases. It is estimated that a one 
percent increase in capital asset ratio increases the lending rate by 17.33 basis 
points. The effect is found to be different when the analysis is conducted for 
banks with different ownership. State banks decrease their lending rates by 
125.41 basis points whereas private and foreign banks increase their lending 
rates by 8.43 and 43.85 basis points respectively, when equity to asset ratio 
increases by 1%. 
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Second, how banks change their capital and risk levels when they are 
exposed to regulatory pressure to increase their capital adequacy ratio is 
examined. It is found that Turkish banks do not react significantly to 
regulatory pressure. The insignificant reaction of Turkish banks can be 
explained by high level of buffers held by Turkish banks during the sample 
period. Between December 2002 and December 2013, Turkish banks have 
16.40% E/A ratio which is higher than the regulatory minimum. Since they are 
holding more than required, Turkish banks do not need to change their 
behavior when they are exposed to regulatory pressure. When the analysis is 
employed for banks with different ownership type, private, state and foreign 
banks are found to react differently to regulatory pressure. It is found that 
private banks do not change their capital and risk level significantly, state 
banks increase their capital and foreign banks decrease their risk level 
significantly in order to comply with capital requirements when they are 
exposed to regulatory pressure. 
 
There are some limitations of this study. The insignificant coefficient on 
the regulatory pressure on the changes in capital can be explained by usage of 
monthly data in the analysis. Banks may not change their equity to asset ratio 
on a monthly basis. This time frequency may not be enough to recognize the 
changes in the capital adequacy ratio of Turkish banks. Another limitation is 
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the definition of regulatory pressure. I use the regulatory pressure variable 
which is defined by Ediz et al. (1998), but it may not measure regulatory 
pressure on Turkish banks. Moreover, the scarcity of data limits the 
comprehensiveness of the study. Basel capital requirements are based on 
capital adequacy ratio but I use equity to asset ratio as its proxy in the 
analyses. 
 
There are some further research opportunities in this area. As the next 
step, the detailed analysis for the state banks’ response for the equity to asset 
ratio changes may be conducted to understand the underlying reasons.  
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APPENDICES 
 
 
APPENDIX A: ECONOMETRICAL TESTS 
 
Test for Serial Correlation 
  
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
F(  1,      26) =     17.764 
Prob > F =      0.0003 
  
 
Test for Heteroscedasticity 
  
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model 
  
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
  
chi2 (29)  =   49523.78 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
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Test for Endogeneity3 
Dependent Variable: Lending Rate   
Constant 27.3649 
  (18.1138) 
Equity to asset ratio 21.4617*** 
  (5.7954) 
Deposit Rate 0.5369*** 
  (0.0707) 
Non-Interest Expense -0.1709 
  (0.2827) 
Non-Performing Loans to Asset -0.1566* 
  (0.0866) 
Logarithm of assets 0.3297 
  (1.1571) 
Residuals 21.8746*** 
  (5.2207) 
Reg 2007 -0.1538 
  (0.2604) 
Reg 2012 -0.4554 
  (0.3667) 
d2004 -9.4554*** 
  (1.6044) 
d2005 -14.5120*** 
  (1.9525) 
d2006 -18.7843*** 
  (1.7770) 
d2007 -19.1964*** 
  (1.8289) 
d2008 -20.2286*** 
  (2.0121) 
d2009 -19.4616*** 
  (2.5037) 
d2010 -24.3782*** 
  (2.6432) 
d2011 -25.5366*** 
  (2.7548) 
d2012 -24.5827*** 
  (2.7885) 
d2013 -26.0421*** 
  (2.9735) 
within R-squared 0.7846 
F Value 689.11 
P Value 0.0000 
Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted standard errors are represented in parentheses and significances of 1 
(***), 5 (**) and 10 (*) are indicated. 
                                                          
3
 I used the residuals of equity to asset regression in the first stage as the independent variable lending rate model. 
Since the residual coefficient is significant I concluded that equity to asset variable is the endogen variable. 
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Hausman Test for Random vs. Fixed4 
  
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
  
chi2(17) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
 =       30.59 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0224 
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 I run the models both with fixed and random effects. Then I applied Hausman test for the predicted results and 
concluded that fixed effect is a better choice. 
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APPENDIX B: ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
 
Table. Results of the Fixed Effect Model 
Dependent Variable: Lending 
Rate Nominal  Real  State  Private  Foreign  
Constant   28.4815*** 27.7445*** 150.9165*** 32.1629*** 17.9817 
    (8.0278) (4.9210) (28.9353) (9.1118) (16.6189) 
Equity to asset ratio   22.4132*** 22.8074*** -89.1142*** 11.8969*** 42.2030*** 
    (3.0453) (2.7214) (12.9220) (3.2177) (7.4100) 
Deposit Rate   0.5284*** 0.5996*** 0.5235*** 0.6060*** 0.3581*** 
    (0.0393) (0.0379) (0.0607) (0.04723) (0.0791) 
Non-
Interest 
Expense   
-0.1808 -0.2450 -0.1186 0.0883 -0.4413 
    (0.2120) (0.2113) (1.1945) (0.2273) (0.4233) 
Non-Performing Loans to Asset -0.1653*** -16.9024*** 2.1451*** 0.1570** -1.4767*** 
    (0.0618) (6.1517) (0.3154) (0.0617) (0.2038) 
Logarithm of assets   0.2730 0.1236 -7.2369*** -0.2202 1.5975 
    (0.5090) (0.3032) (1.6816) (0.5784) (1.0833) 
Reg 2007   -0.1571 0.0406 -0.0040 -0.1884 0.0775 
    (0.7109) (0.7076) (1.0046) (0.8672) (1.3695) 
Reg 2012   -0.4997 -0.3459 1.0403 0.1980 -1.6420 
    (1.0117) (1.0067) (1.4165) (1.2230) (1.9801) 
d2004   -9.6730*** -8.5532*** -7.7820*** -7.9950*** -12.5382*** 
    (0.6777) (0.6501) (1.1325) (0.8220) (1.2942) 
d2005   -14.7593*** -13.1469*** -4.3366*** -12.4192*** -20.0527*** 
    (0.8404) (0.7848) (1.3856) (1.0297) (1.5991) 
d2006   -19.0030*** -17.3762*** -4.3030*** -16.3167*** -25.4167*** 
    (0.8931) (0.8100) (1.5314) (1.0891) (1.7142) 
d2007   -19.3998*** -17.8764*** -3.6391** -16.2532*** -26.3369*** 
    (0.9789) (0.8784) (1.6662) (1.2032) (1.8731) 
d2008   -20.4230*** -18.9878*** -5.4753*** -17.3469*** -27.1075*** 
    (1.1738) (1.0519) (1.9820) (1.4184) (2.3068) 
d2009   -19.6997*** -17.7097*** -3.5490 -16.5422*** -25.3304*** 
    (1.3257) (1.1730) (2.2719) (1.5960) (2.6322) 
d2010   -24.6321*** -22.4085*** -4.3274* -21.3603*** -30.4746*** 
    (1.4162) (1.2429) (2.4967) (1.7103) (2.8004) 
d2011   -25.7561*** -23.6407*** -3.8740 -21.8564*** -33.2619*** 
    (1.4763) (1.2671) (2.7273) (1.7839) (2.8777) 
d2012   -24.7806*** -22.5187*** -2.3658 -20.7107*** -32.7215*** 
    (1.5140) (1.2615) (2.8223) (1.8223) (2.9605) 
d2013   -26.1985*** -23.7620*** -3.0816 -22.3008*** -34.2632*** 
    (1.6956) (1.4323) (3.1676) (2.0321) (3.3363) 
R-squared 
within 0.7921 0.7880 0.9323 0.8332 0.7587 
between 0.7266 0.7069 0.9836 0.845 0.149 
overall 0.6678 0.657 0.9029 0.7505 0.5726 
F Value   688.47 671.57 304.75 447.27 210.66 
P Value   0 0 0 0 0 
Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted standard errors are represented in parentheses and significances of 1 
(***), 5 (**) and 10 (*) are indicated. 
